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GENE SHREVE
Fact, Value and Action in Nonconceptual
Jurisprudence
Our topic, "The Structure of Legal Systems,"1 has long been a
playground for academics in this country. It is, to use Professor Jac-.
ques Vanderlinden's term, "professors' law."2 To ponder the struc-
ture of a legal system in any concrete way is to traffic in
nonconceptual jurisprudence. 3 That is, to consider, as a scholar
would in the social sciences, matters of evidence, cause and effect,
and predictive possibility.4 Nonconceptual jurisprudence therefore
includes far more than self-consciously "jurisprudential" writing. It
is a paradigm for much legal literature: "This is what is happening;
this is why it is undesirable; this is how we can fix the law to make
the problem go away."
Nonconceptual jurisprudence conveys theories in abundance,
but, unlike those of conceptual jurisprudence,5 the theories of non-
conceptual jurisprudence are falsifiable. 6 The goal of nonconceptual
GENE SHREVE is Richard S. Melvin Professor of Law, Indiana University-Blooming-
ton. The author wishes to thank Brian Bix, Brian Jamahaha, and Susan Williams for
their comments on the manuscript.
1. I am grateful to the American Society of Comparative Law for inviting me to
serve as the United States reporter for this subdivision of the second topic set for the
Sixteenth International Congress of Comparative Law: "General Legal Theory and
Legal Philosophy."
2. Jacques Vanderlinden, "The Structure of Legal Systems 4 (unpublished mem-
orandum) (2001).
3. In his useful study of jurisprudence, Brian Bix distinguishes the conceptual
from the nonconceptual:
A conceptual claim, as opposed to a claim that is meant to be predictive or
explanatory, is not falsifiable (rebuttable). * * * I am referring to theories
which divide up the world into categories: this is "law" and this is not; or this
is "art" and this is not. * * * Conceptual theories define terms by necessary
and sufficient conditions. Such definitions cannot be directly verified or re-
butted by empirical observation. .. "
Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context 14 (2nd ed. 2001) (emphasis in
original).
4. Non-conceptual theories in the social sciences.. .tend toward conclusions
about causation and causal regularities, but (in contrast to non-conceptual
theories in the natural sciences) the selection of relevant data tends to turn
at least in part on complicated, and contested, value judgments."
Bix, supra note cb, at pp. 13.
5. See n. 3, supra.
6. These theories. . .are falsifiable (if "falsifiable" is to strong for some
tastes, one might be able to use "rebuttable" as a substitute). If the data we
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theory is to state something intellectually interesting and socially
useful about the law and its effects that can withstand disproof.
Legal dialogue 7 provides the crucible for testing theories of non-
conceptual jurisprudence. Academic debates are an inevitable and
continuing part of the dialogue.8 Yet, as in jurisprudence literature
generally, the debates are often "best understood as theorists talking
past one another."9 The purpose of this paper is to offer a means for
facilitating something closer to true legal dialogue-where partici-
pants talk to rather than past each other.
A shared concern about the effect of law on society sustains legal
dialogue. That dialogue, or debate, is a fabric of assertions and
counter-assertions. My suggestion is that all assertions (made or im-
plied) are means by which participants in legal dialogue attempt rep-
resentations about one of three very different things: fact, value and
action.
Assertions of Fact (Empiricism)
Assertions about facts attempt to represent what is really going
on in the world. A term for the scholarly examination of facts would
be empiricism. 10
It helps in understanding empiricism to see it as a thing apart
from theory. Empiricism and theory are coordinate features of
human belief. "[A]n empirical belief is one capable of being confirmed
or disconfirmed by sense experience."1 ' "[A]n empirical quality of
collect in the future does not fit the predictions made according to the theory,
we should at least begin to suspect that the theory might be wrong.
Bix, supra n. 3, at 13.
7. I mean the ordinary meaning of this term: "[a] conversation carried on be-
tween two or more persons" (The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary
(197 1); "[a] traditional semitechnical term for a conversation, especially if it is formal"
(The Oxford Companion to the English Language 301 (Tom McArthur ed., 1992)). This
includes written conversation, usually by scholarly works.
I have chosen the term dialogue over others, including discourse and dialectic.
The last two carry more baggage, as in discourse theory (see, e.g., The Johns Hopkins
Guide to Literary Theory and Criticism 210-12 (Michael Groden & Martin Kreiswirth
eds., (1994) or dialectical materialism (see, e.g., The Cambridge Dictionary of Philoso-
phy 465 (Robert Audi ed., 1995). The term dialogue carries some baggage also, as in
the use of dialogue as a model for critical social science theory (see, e.g., Comstock, "A
Method for Critical Research," appearing in Readings in the Philosophy of Social Sci-
ence 625-39 (Michael Martin & Lee C. McIntyre eds., 1994).
8. So much so that the words dialogue and debate will be used interchangeably
in this paper.
9. Bix, supra n. 3, at 9. "[D]ifferent theories seem to be responding to different
types of inquiries and are making different kinds of claims." Id. at 12.
10. Of the three kinds of assertions made in legal dialogue, empirical claims are
the least familiar to academic lawyers. Therefore, I will explain them at greater
length. The discussion of empiricism in this paper borrows freely from Shreve, "Con-
flicts Empiricism," 37 Willamette L. Rev. 249 (Symposium-2001).
11. Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 118-19 (1994). "A
statement, proposition, or judgment is empirical if we can only know its truth or fal-
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things is one that can be represented in sense experience, as opposed
to an inferred or postulated theoretical property. 1 2 Theory is "the
sense of the principles or methods of a science or art rather than its
practice.' 3 It is "the sense of an explanation based on observation
and reasoning." Theory is something we create; "it sets rules and
thus functions like fundamentalism."' 4
The acquisition of human knowledge requires incessant travel
between the realms of empiricism' 5 and theory. For example, we
have a succession of experiences as children where touching some-
thing hot causes pain. Our recollection of these experiences (a simple
form of empiricism) eventually stirs something in us, providing the
incentive and inspiration to develop a theory about hot things: (1)
touching them causes pain; (2) pain makes us unhappy;' 6 (3) there-
fore, we will avoid touching hot things whenever we can.
Even the most commonplace exercises of empiricism are impor-
tant because they enable us to add things up, to make sense out of
our existence. But it is scientific empiricism-the disciplined, sys-
tematic empiricism of the natural and social sciences-that best in-
forms academic theory. Academic theory is both altruistic and self-
seeking, the latter because it secures for academics a privileged place
within their formal subcultures of expertise.' 7 They are responsible
for the epistemologies of their fields: the communication of justified
true belief.' 8 Scientifically empirical "data"'9 most convincingly jus-
tify true belief (academic theory), enhancing the academic's commu-
nication of knowledge and claim to expertise. 20
Data in this sense represent the results of controlled, repeated
factual investigations. The scientific empiricist creates a research
sity by appealing to experience." Lacey, "Empirical," in The Oxford Companion to
Philosophy 226 (Ted Honderich, ed. (1995).
12. Blackburn, supra n. 11, at 119.
13. The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology 1132, (Robert K. Barnhart ed. 1988).
14. Mieke Bal, "Scared to death," appearing in The Point of Theory 33 (Mieke Bal
& Inge E. Boer eds., 1994).
15. I intend for "empiricism" its generic application: "The use of empirical meth-
ods in any art or science." Oxford English Dictionary, supra n. 7. That is to say, I do
not intend for the term the meaning it carries in philosophical movements of empiri-
cism: "that experience has primacy in human knowledge and justified belief." Wolter-
storff, "Empiricism," appearing in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 224
(Robert Audi ed., 1995).
16. Here we also draw on experiences with pain not caused by hot things.
17. Cheryl Geisler, Academic Literacy and the Nature of Expertise 70-75 (1994).
18. On the character of knowledge as justified true belief and the features of such
knowledge, see Shreve, "Every Conflicts Decision is a Promise Broken," 60 La. L. Rev.
1345 (Symposium-2000).
19. Or, perhaps more accurately, the causal inferences from such data. Hubert
M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research 62 (1964).
20. For academics, "the professional privileges of autonomy and high social sta-
tus, constrained by a normative commitment to service, were all built upon a founda-
tion of cognitive expertise." Geisler, supra n. 17, at 73.
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"model"21 for the inquiry, seeking in the same way the same facts
from a category of like sources. 22 This may take the form of data
from experimentation; 23 collection of data from inert, passive
sources 24 or collection of data from active (perhaps interactive)
sources. 25 Unscientific empiricism occurs without the discipline of a
research model. Investigations are casual, episodic and largely unex-
plained. They rest to a large degree on "a priori" or "common sense"
assumptions. 26 The results are, in a word, anecdotal. 27
In the natural sciences it is usually enough for theory to state
and support a causal rule, viz., to explain why a particular phenome-
non occurs and will repeat itself.28 But often for law (and social sci-
ences generally) theory must also be an instrument for good. That is
to say, it is not enough for theory to explain a causal rule (touching
hot things causes pain). It must also set a direction for behavior in
light of the causal rule (avoid touching hot things).
An empirical assertion in legal dialogue would be: "this (and not
something else) is happening." Empirical counter-assertions may at-
tempt refutation-"this is not what is happening (something else is
happening instead)." Or they may attempt skepticism-"we do not
know what is happening." Empirical arguments involve the search
for facts.
Assertions About Value (Normativism)
Assertions about value attempt to judge the desirability of em-
pirical phenomena (what is happening) or the desirability of what
could happen. Another term for value would be normativism.2 9
21. See Russell L. Ackoff, The Design of Social Research 5 (1953); Johan Galtung,
Theory and Methods of Social Research 29-36 (1969).
22. The shape of the model must be explained and justified as the research meth-
odology. Ackoff, supra n. 21, at 6.
23. Generally, see Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science 60-61
(1962); Kincaid, "Defending Laws in the Social Sciences," in Readings in the Philoso-
phy of Social Science 127-28 (Michael Martin & Lee C. McIntyre eds., 1994).
24. See, for example, John D. Bessler, Death in the Dark-Midnight Executions in
America 213-20 (1997) (compiling the time of day (or night) when all executions oc-
curred in the United States from 1977-1995).
25. Generally see A.R. Louch, Explanation and Human Action (1966); Issues in
Participant Observation (George J. McCall & J.L. Simmons eds., 1969). For an inter-
esting example, see Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Divorce Lawyers and
Their Clients-Power and Meaning in the Legal Process (1995).
26. Keith Smith, "Distribution-free Statistical Methods and the Concept of Power
Efficiency," in Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences 536 (Leon Festinger &
Daniel Katz eds., 1953).
27. Our colleagues in the social sciences would be quick to add that the plural of
"anecdote" is not "data".
28. Numerous examples appear in Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (3rd ed. 1996).
29. "'Normative' is the adjective derived from the noun 'norm', which signi-
fies... in philosophical discussion a standard, rule, principle used to judge or direct
human conduct as something to be complied with." Nicholas Dent, "Normative," ap-
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Accepted empirical assertions that certain facts do (or do not) ex-
ist invite normative assertions that such factual conditions are good
or bad. Even procedural law has a normative quotient. 30 For present
purposes, however, it is easier to confine the concept to the norms of
political philosophy or morality in substantive law.
It has been said that there are only two questions in political
philosophy: 'who gets what?', and 'says who?' Not quite true
but close enough to be a useful starting-point. The first of
these questions is about the distribution of material goods,
and of rights and liberties. On what basis should people pos-
sess property? What rights and liberties should they enjoy?
The second question concerns the distribution of another
good: political power. * * * Political power includes the right
to command others, and to subject them to punishment if
they disobey. Who should hold this power?31
Such norms are explicit in public law subjects like constitutional
and criminal law, but they are also central to torts, property, con-
tracts and other areas of private substantive law. Law exists to se-
cure certain values. The processes of government will enforce law to
make those values real in the life of the community.
A normative assertion would be, "what is happening is undesir-
able because a particular something that could happen instead would
be better." Normative counter-assertions may attempt refutation-
"what is happening is not undesirable because it is as good or better
than the particular something else that could happen instead." Or
they may be competitive-"the normative judgment is itself undesir-
able because it distracts attention from an entirely different and
more important normative inquiry." Normative arguments involve
the search for problems.
Assertions About Action (Instrumentalism)
Assertions about action are about the capacity of law to affect
society. Another term for action would be instrumentalism.3 2 When
pearing in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy 626 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995). "A
norm is a rule for behavior, or a definite pattern of behavior, departure from which
renders a person liable to some kind of censure." Blackburn, supra n. 11, at 265. "The
nature of norms, the source of their authority, and the form they should take, occupy
centre-stage in any theory of ethics, philosophy of language, and law." Blackburn, id.
30. "The foremost quality of good procedural rules is fairness." Shreve, "Question-
ing Intervention of Right," 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 894, 907 (1980).
31. Jonathan Wolff, An Introduction to Political Philosophy 1 (1996).
32. Some item has instrumental value just to the extent that it lends itself
(fortuitously or by design) effectively to the achievement of some desired or
valued purpose. It is that which is 'good as a means to. . .'. Hammers, chisels,
and tools of all kinds are palmary instances of instrumentally valued items.
Dent, "Instrumental Value," appearing in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy 410
(Ted Honderich ed., 1995). The form of instrumentalism intended here is that repre-
sented in the philosophy of John Dewey.
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we accept empirical assertions that certain facts do (or do not) exist,
and when we further accept normative assertions that factual condi-
tions are problematic (undesirable), instrumentalism in legal the-
ory3 3 searches for changes in the law that would produce more
desirable factual conditions.
An instrumental assertion would be: "a new legal rule will in op-
eration displace the wrong thing happening with something more de-
sirable." Instrumental counter-assertions may attempt refutation-
"nothing will change." Or they may be skeptical. Or they may ascribe
excessive cost, inefficiency, or mischief to the reform proposed. An
example of the last would be, "the new rule will have the incidental
effect of disrupting things that are desirable." Instrumental argu-
ments involve the search for solutions.
Naturally, these three types of legal assertion do not always ap-
pear in legal dialogue in the order described above. Rather they exist
in dynamic, interactive relation. Problem assertions may set off a
fresh round of empirical investigations, and so forth.
Toward an Ethic and Critique of Legal Dialogue
Why attempt to differentiate in this manner forms of assertion in
nonconceptual jurisprudence? The answer is: to better follow what
has been done and what has been left undone in legal dialogue. But
that in turn raises a question. What should be the purpose of legal
dialogue?
Deweyan instrumentalism is a general functional account of all concepts (sci-
entific ones included) wherein the epistemic status of concepts and the ra-
tionality status of actions are seen as a function of their role in integrating,
predicting, and controlling our concrete interactions with our experienced
world.
CF. Delaney,"Instrumentalism," appearing in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philoso-
phy 379 (Robert Audi ed., 1995).
33. Professor Robert Summers attributed four features to legal instrumentalism:
First, it views law not as a set of general axioms or conceptions from which
legal personnel may formally derive particular decisions, but as a body of
practical tools for serving specific substantive goals. Second, it conceives law
not as an autonomous and self-sufficient system, but as merely a means to
achieve external goals that are derived from sources outside the law, includ-
ing the dictates of democratic processes and the 'policy sciences.' Third, it
assumes that a particular use of law cannot be a self-justifying 'end in itself.'
Uses of law can be justified only by reference to whatever values they fulfill.
Finally, the law is considered to serve generally instrumental values rather
than intrinsic ones. That is, law's function is to satisfy democratically ex-
pressed wants and interests, whatever they may be (within constitutional
limits).
"Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought-A Syn-
thesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use," 66
Corn. L. Rev. 861, 863 (1981). "Some instrumentalists, however-the radical fringe
on the edge of legal realism-are 'rule skeptics."' Lyons, "Legal Formalism and In-
strumentalism-A Pathological Study," 66 Corn. L. Rev. 949, 952 (1981).
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It helps at this point to recall the falsifiable character of noncon-
ceptual jurisprudence. If dialogue is a crucible, we determine that
ideas about what the law is (or should be) emerge tested and
strengthened from that crucible only in those instances where the re-
lated assertions about fact, value and reform EACH seem persua-
sive.3 4 For all the personal antagonisms that have littered legal
dialogue, it is possible to see that the dialogue (debate)is a positive,
collaborative-even altruistic- venture. Ideally, a speaker making
assertions is herself still in the process of questioning them. Thus the
speaker seeks help from others in the dialogue in answering the
question whether her own assertions are falsifiable. Few assertions
in legal dialogue are sacred.35 Most all are open to disproof.36
Benign as these suggestions may sound, they place me in appar-
ent disagreement with a number of other writers. For example, they
suggest a rational, progressive conception of the law that
postmodernists would not share. 37 And, by insisting on persuasive
normative-well as empirical and instrumental-assertions, my view
is at odds with many in the law and economics movement. 38
APPENDIX
An Introductory Note on Postmodernism
Beginning in the arts, postmodernism has become a force in criti-
cal theory for many areas including law.39 A reference to it appears
34. This is not to say of course that a single speaker in the dialogue is always
required persuasively to present all three types of assertions. Just as speakers are
entitled to build on the work of earlier participants in the dialogue, so are earlier or
initial participants permitted to provide assertions that merely start us off in our
thinking.
35. A few taboos remain in our society, e.g., incest, cannibalism, child pornogra-
phy. The only normative assertions about taboos that are socially and culturally ac-
ceptable are that taboos are bad and to be avoided. To that extent, such assertions are
not really open to falsification in legal dialogue.
36. Of course, to persuasively challenge some, e.g., the empirical assertion that
night follows day, might seem too difficult to merit the effort.
37. For my domestic and international colleagues who have puzzled as I have over
the meaning of postmodernism, I have attached an explanatory note as an appendix
to this paper.
38. That body of legal-economic thought which emphasizes the ethic of
wealth-maximization... 'does not and cannot give a unique determinate so-
lution to the question of the choice of right' to be protected in the process of
adjudication...
Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence 311 (1995) (quoting Warren J.
Samuels and Nicholas Mercuro, "Posnerian Law and Economics on the Bench," 4 Int.
Rev. Law & Econ. 107, 123 v(1984)). "There appear to be more important types of
reasons for legal decisions--'rightness reasons'-that are not obviously collapsible
into future-regarding consequentialist reasons of the kind that appeal so strongly to
economists." Summers, "The Future of Economics in Legal Education: Limits and
Constraints," 33 J. Leg. Ed. 337, 339 (1983).
39. See, e.g., Helen Stacy, Postmodernism and Law (2001); Feldman, "Playing
with the Pieces: Postmodernism in the Lawyer's Toolbox," 85 Va. L. Rev. 151 (1999);
Gary Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements-Law and Jurisprudence at Century's
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in this paper. 40 This is not the first time I have raised the specter of
postmodernism in my writing. I have always done so with some dis-
comfort, because the term has been daunting not only to me but to
many other academic lawyers here and abroad. I have been tempted
to try to explain postmodernism in footnotes, but I always rejected
the idea because the size of the notes would have dwarfed the text.
This rather curious appendage to my paper is an attempt to address
that problem.
Postmodernism is largely a critique and rejection of modernity.
Beginning roughly at the conclusion of the Middle Ages, the modern
period marked the passing of the ecclesiastical domination of West-
ern culture. By one account, "the early humanist notion of human
creativity came to form a combustive mixture with the negative con-
clusions of nominalist theology" causing "the cultural explosion that
we refer to as modernity."41 Rationality 2 was the linchpin of mod-
ernism. And from its faith in the power of reason, modernism drew
its perennial optimism, its idea of human progress (humanism).43
Many in addition to postmodernists believe that modernism is
now in a state of crisis. Faith in the modernist assumption that im-
provement of the human condition will follow reason has faltered. 44
End 224-46 (1995); "Postmodernism and Law: A Symposium," 62 Univ. of Colorado L.
Rev. 439 (1991); "Symposium: Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice," 11 Car-
dozo L. Rev. 919 (1990).
40. See the text accompanying supra n. 37.
41. At the end of the Middle Ages, ... nominalist theology effectively removed
God from creation.***The divine became relegated to a supernatural sphere
separate from nature, with which it retained no more than a causal, external
link. This removal of transcendence fundamentally affected the conveyance
of meaning. Whereas previously meaning had been established in the very
act of creation by a wise God, it now fell upon the human mind to interpret a
cosmos, the structure of which had ceased to be given as intelligible. Instead
of being an integral part of the cosmos, the person became its source of mean-
ing.***[T]he mind became the spiritual substratum of all reality. Only what
it objectively constituted would count as real.
Louis Dupre, Passage to Modernity 3 (1993).
42. Rationality denotes following a rule as opposed to acing on impulse or at
random. Rationality means consistency in linking our thoughts or state-
ments, creating the logical order of premise to conclusion. It also means con-
sistency in linking our actions, creating the efficient order of means to end.
David Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity 10 (1986).
43. "Belief in progress requires a level of abstraction unknown to premodern peo-
ples." Thomas Fleming, The Politics of Human Nature 14 (1993).
The theoretical discourses of modernity from Descartes through the Enlight-
enment and its progeny championed reason as the source of progress in
knowledge and society, as well as the privileged locus of truth and the foun-
dation of systematic knowledge. Reason was deemed competent to discover
adequate theoretical and practical norms upon which systems of thought and
action could be built and society could be restructured.
Steven Best & Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory 2 (1991).
44. See Dupre, supra n. 41, at 1 ("Undoubtedly, there are good reasons to distrust
the equation of the real with the objectifiable, progress with technological advances,
and liberty of thought and action with detachment from tradition and social bonds.").
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Consider, for example, the descent of the idea of progress in the
United States over the twentieth century. At the beginning of the
century, progressivism sounded a strong note of modernist optimism
and declared progress inevitable. 45 The picture had become more
complicated and more troubled by mid-century; progress was no
longer certain. 46 Now, with the end of the century, we have to be
convinced that progress is even possible.47
Moreover, doubts have increased about the sufficiency of mod-
ernism's rationalist foundation. Of particular concern is the question
whether, after banishing as irrational the value-laden "taboos" of the
premodern period, modernism retains in rationalism a means for
equipping a moral society.48 The crisis of modernism may be that it
can neither move backward to premodern regimentation nor forward
out of its stalled, aimless condition. 49
What sets postmodernism apart is its extreme reaction to this
problem.50 Influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger,
by French cultural theorists Michel Foucault and Jaques Derrida, 51
45. See, e.g., Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life (1909).
46. See, e.g., Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Vital Center (1949).
47. See, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent-America in Search of a
Public Philosophy (1996).
48. [I]n the normal sense of "rationality" there are no more rational grounds
for respecting human life and human personal rights than there are, say, for
forbidding the consumption of shrimp among Jews, of meat on Friday among
Christians, and of wine among Muslims. They are all "irrational" taboos. And
a totalitarian systems which treats people as exchangeable parts in the state
machinery, to be used, discarded, or destroyed according to the state's need,
is in a sense a triumph of rationality.
Leszek Kolakowski, Modernity on Endless Trial 13 (1990). Cf. Best & Kellner, supra
n. 43, at 3 ("the construction of modernity produced untold suffering and misery for its
victims... *** Modernity also produced a set of disciplinary institutions, practices,
and discourses which legitimate its modes of domination and control").
49. There is no obvious way to put the pieces back together. If we could re-
turn to tradition, we would have meaning and humane living but at the price
of freedom... Modernity promises freedom and rationality but may give us
deadening routine. It also forces us to choose, without any grounds for our
choice, what values we will hold. *** Can we avoid the dilemma of rootless
freedom versus oppressive tradition?
Kolb, supra n. 42, at 16-17.
50. There were always doubts about the modernist project. They proliferated and
became bolder and more systematic over time. For a description of their "pre-
postmodern" development, see Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern 49-62
(1993). "They raise what had been only a distinction, then a separation, then a contra-
diction, then an insurmountable tension, to the level of an imcommensurability." Id.
at 59.
51. For a book-length study of contributions of the four to postmodernism, see
Allan Megill, Prophets of Extremity-Nietzshe, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida (1987).
Additional sources on their influence on postmodernism include Hillary Lawson, Re-
flexivity-The Post-modern Predicament (1985) (Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida);
Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity (1988) (Nietzsche and Heidegger); Stephen K.
White, Political Theory and Postmodernism 31-84 (1991) (Heidegger and Derrida);
Eric Matthews, Twentieth-Century French Philosophy 147-57, 165-78 (1996) (Fou-
cault and Derrida); Steven Best, The Politics of Historical Vision 85-144 (1995) (Fou-
cault); The Cambridge Companion to Foucault (Gary Gutting ed., 1994).
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and others, postmodernism attacks modernism root and branch. It
proceeds from a "fundamental assumption of cultural crisis, of a dere-
lict present, of a nothing out of which everything must be created."52
Against rationalism, postmodernists make "a frontal assault on
methodological unity" and attempt to pull down "philosophical pil-
lars... the most notable of which are the 'unities' of meaning, theory
and self."'53 Seeing humanism as the false (perhaps deceitful) boast
of rationalism, they reject humanist justification.54 Suspicious and
hyperactive, postmodernists try "to take the temperature of the age
without instruments," unsure that "there is so coherent a thing as an
'age,' or zeitgeist or 'system' or 'current situation' any longer."55
52. Megill, supra n. 51, at 183 (attributing this view to Foucault).
53. Hassard, "Postmodernism and Organizational Analysis: an Overview," in
Postmodernism and Organizations 1 (John Hassard & Martin Parker, eds. 1993).
54. Best & Kellner, supra n. 43, at 19-20.
55. Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism xi
(1991).
The statements appearing in the text may seem less like a definition of
postmodernism than a report of postmodernist behavior. It has in fact much easier to
present the latter. "An industry of definition and subdefinition has grown up around
the question of the postmodern." David Simpson, The Academic Postmodern and the
Rule of Literature 1 (1993). "The confusion involved in the discourse of the
postmodern results from its usage in different fields and disciplines and the fact that
most theorists and commentators on postmodern discourse provide definitions and
conceptualizations that are frequently at odds with each other and usually inade-
quately theorized." Best & Kellner, supra n.43, at 29. Writers who seem postmodern
do not always accept the label, id. at 30-31. Foucault declared at times that he was a
modernist. Kelly, "Introduction," appearing in Critique and Power-Recasting the Fou-
cault/Habermas Debate 3 (Michael Kelly ed., 1994).
[Vol. 50
